Oil & Gas Survey: West Virginia by Fershee, Josh
Texas A&M Journal of Property 
Law 
Volume 6 
Number 3 Survey on Oil & Gas Article 19 
2020 
Oil & Gas Survey: West Virginia 
Josh Fershee 
Creighton University School of Law, joshuafershee@creighton.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/journal-of-property-law 
 Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua P. Fershee, Oil & Gas Survey: West Virginia, 6 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 210 (2020). 
This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Texas A&M Journal of Property Law by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law 






OIL & GAS SURVEY: WEST VIRGINIA 
 
Joshua P. Fershee* 
 
This Article summarizes and discusses important recent 
developments in West Virginia’s oil and gas law as determined by 
recent West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cases.  There were no 
substantial legislative changes in the current period.  
 
I. ANDREWS V. ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION 
 
In Andrews v. Antero Res. Corp., Antero Resources 
Corporation (“Antero”) derived leasehold rights to develop mineral 
resources in Harrison County, West Virginia, through a severance 
deed.1 The severance deed was executed in the early 1900s and listed 
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certain rights, including the right to drill, bore, and operate oil and gas 
wells.2  
The Petitioners represented holders of the surface rights on 
properties near Antero’s drilling activities and alleged that Antero’s 
mineral operations interfered with the Petitioners use and enjoyment 
of the land.3 Specifically, the Petitioners pointed to the annoyance, 
inconvenience, and discomfort caused by heavy equipment, diesel 
fumes, and other emissions from traffic, and there was no allegation 
of property damage.4 The Petitioners asserted that the operator did not 
have the right to extract natural gas using methods like horizonal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, which were not contemplated when 
the severance deeds were executed in the 1900s.5 Further, they 
asserted, even where the drilling operations were located off-site of 
the Petitioners’ surface estate, Antero had substantially interfered with 
the Petitioners’ use and enjoyment of their surface estate.6 
Under West Virginia law, the owner of mineral rights 
possesses the right to use the surface in a manner and with such means 
as would be fairly necessary for the enjoyment of the mineral estate.7 
However, for an owner of mineral resources to access an implied 
easement for surface rights, it must be demonstrated not only that the 
right is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the mineral, but also 
that the right can be exercised without substantial burden to the surface 
owner.8 
In this case, Antero’s off-site horizontal drilling operations did 
not cause any substantial burden because Antero was within its rights 
to use the surface land to access the minerals below.9 The court, 
consistent with prior rulings, determined that building roads and well 
pads and drilling wells was reasonably necessary for the extraction of 
natural gas.10 Although horizontal drilling was not envisioned at the 
time of deed formation (mineral owners only anticipated the impacts 
of vertical drilling), expert testimony revealed that horizontal drilling 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 862. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 864. 
 6. Id. at 865. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 870.  
 9. Id. at 872. 
 10. Id. at 873. 
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has less of a surface impact than traditional vertical drilling.11 
Furthermore, because the drilling operations were located off-site of 
the Petitioners’ surface estates, the claim was even more attenuated.12  
This case further confirms that under West Virginia law, both 
horizontal and vertical drilling operations constitute surface use in a 
manner reasonably necessary to extract natural gas.13  
 
II. KUPFER V. CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC 
 
In Kupfer v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the Kupfers 
received ninety acres of land by deed in 1980.14 The deed did not 
contain any oil and gas reservations. In 1990, the Kupfers conveyed 
eight parcels of land, plus an additional 60-acre parcel (the “ninth 
parcel”) to Michael Blair.15 The Petitioners’ deed stated that the eight 
parcels were excepted and reserved from all coal, oil, gas, and other 
minerals, thus retaining those mineral rights from the eight parcels.16 
That deed later described the “ninth parcel” but made no reference to 
any reservations or exceptions as to the mineral rights.17  
In September 2000, Michael Blair conveyed his interest in the 
ninth parcel to Zachary Blair using exactly the same language as the 
1990 deed.18 In 2009, Zachary Blair leased the oil and gas resources 
to Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, which then sold and assigned the 
lease in 2014 to the current rights holder, SWN Production 
Company.19 The language of the 1990 deed was preserved in 
subsequent conveyances, explicitly reserving and excepting the oil 
and gas resources for the eight parcels and separately referencing to 
the “ninth parcel” without mentioning a reservation.20 In 2016, the 
Petitioners filed a complaint of trespass and conversion against the 
respondents claiming that they owned the oil and gas rights associated 
 
 11. Id. at 869. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. No. 17-0527, 2018 WL 2175553, at *1 (W. Va. May 11, 2018). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at *2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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with the “ninth parcel,” asserting that those rights were also reserved 
in the 1990 deed.21 
The Kupfers argued that “[a] deed of conveyance, in order to 
pass title, must contain a description of the property being conveyed 
which sufficiently identifies the land, either by the language of the 
granting clause itself or by reference to extrinsic facts which render 
the description certain.”22 Additionally, they argued that the subject 
deed provided lists of the parcels to be conveyed early in the 
document, and that language “completed the conveyance.”23 They 
further claimed that additional descriptions of the individual parcels 
appearing later in the deed were not needed.24 Therefore, they claimed 
that if the later “unnecessary parcel by parcel description is removed,” 
the remaining deed language was sufficient to identify what was 
conveyed, reserving and excepting oil and gas rights for all parcels, 
including the ninth parcel.25  
The court disagreed, stating that “Petitioners’ argument is 
fundamentally flawed in that it focuses on but one portion of the 
subject deed and fails to consider all of the parts together so as to give 
effect to the intention of the parties.”26 The court further explained, “it 
is axiomatic that ‘[p]arties are bound by general and ordinary 
meanings of words used in deeds.’”27  
Under West Virginia law, in order to pass title, a deed of 
conveyance must contain a description of the property being conveyed 
that sufficiently identifies the land, either by the language of the grant 
clause itself or by reference to extrinsic facts that render description 
certain. Here, the deed contained a distinct description of parcels one 
through eight and includes language regarding the oil and gas 
reservations. However, the “ninth parcel” is described in a separate 
portion of the document, and the description is silent on oil and gas 
reservations. In this case, the court determined that the deed did not 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at *3 (quoting Sally-Mike Props. v. Yokum, 332 S.E.2d 597, 602 (W. Va. 
1985)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at *6–7. 
 25. Id. at *7. 
 26. Id. at *8. 
 27. Id. at *10. (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, McDonough Co. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours 
& Co., Inc., 280 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1981); Syl. Pt. 1, Meadows v. Belknap, 483 
S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1997)). 
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reserve or except any coal, oil, or gas. As such, the Petitioners do not 
own the parcel of land, and therefore lack standing to bring forth any 
claim. 
 




Margot Beth Crowder and David Wentz own surface land 
(“Crowder Land”) that had been part of a larger tract of land in 
Doddridge County, West Virginia. The mineral rights of that land 
were leased in 1901 to a predecessor of EQT Production Company 
(“EQT”) to drill for oil and gas. EQT drilled horizontal wells on the 
Crowder Land surface that extended under neighboring properties and 
to natural gas. In 2011, EQT sought to pool the rights provided under 
the 1901 lease with other leases it held so it could drill and extract oil 
and gas on neighboring lands. EQT obtained a pooling clause in a 
modified deed in 2011 from the mineral owners but not from the 
surface owners of Crowder and Wentz.  
EQT then drilled horizontal wells on the Crowder Land, which 
produced gas derived from neighboring properties. Crowder and 
Wentz sued, claiming that EQT’s lease did not allow the company to 
use the Crowder Land surface estate to extract oil and gas from 
neighboring mineral estates. The lease did not have a pooling clause. 
Instead, the lease only granted permission to extract oil and gas from 
the mineral estate below the Crowder Land surface.   
The Circuit Court of Doddridge County ruled in favor of 
Crowder and Wentz and entered an order granting partial summary 
judgment, finding that EQT trespassed when it used the Respondent’s 
surface lands to conduct operations on neighboring properties. A jury 
awarded $190,000 in damages. EQT brought this appeal.   
The high court determined that mineral lessees have “an 
implied right to use the surface of a tract in any way reasonable and 
necessary to the development of minerals underlying the tract.”28 It is 
worth noting that the court confirmed that the use of horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing is reasonable and necessary. However, the 
court continued, “a mineral owner or lessee does not have the right to 
 
 28. EQT Prod. Co. v. Crowder, 828 S.E.2d 800, 801 (W. Va. 2019). 
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use the surface to benefit mining or drilling operations on other lands, 
in the absence of an express agreement with the surface owner 
permitting those operations.”29   
In addition, the court explained that the owners of the mineral 
estate could not provide pooling rights to use the Crowder Land 
because the mineral owners “no longer owned the right to use the 
surface estate for exploration on and production from neighboring 
tracts.”30 The mineral estate had been severed from the surface in 
1936, meaning the pooling right “was a right attached to the surface 
estate.”31  
This decision could (and should) have the effect of overruling 
a 2016 lower court decision. Back in April 2016, a West Virginia case 
ruled that there was an implied right to pool in oil and gas leases.32 
The EQT decision corrects this erroneous decision, which implied that 
all oil and gas leases come with an implied right of pooling.33 
 
IV. L&D INVESTMENTS, INC. V. MIKE ROSS, INC. 
 
Charles Lee Andrews (“Charles”), as trustee for his mother, 
Mary, held a fee simple title to two tracts of land.34 The surface land 
was eventually divided among Mary’s descendants, and the oil and 
gas wealth was conveyed to several different individuals.35 A real 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. At 810. 
 31. Id. 
 32. There is an Implied Right to Pool an Oil and Gas Lease, Jackson Kelly LLC 
Oil and Gas Update, https://oilandgas.jacksonkelly.com/2016/04/there-is-an-
implied-right-to-pool-an-oil-and-gas-lease.html (April 20, 2016) (discussing 
American Energy-Marcellus LLC v. Poling, Circuit Court of Tyler County, West 
Virginia, Civil Action No. 15-C-34 H). 
 33. See Joshua P. Fershee, Oil & Gas Survey: West Virginia, 5 TEX. A&M J. 
PROP. L. 169 (2019); Taryn Phaneuf, Professor says judge’s opinion on implied 
pooling rights marks departure from state oil and gas law, THE W. VA. REC. (Aug. 
11, 2016), https://wvrecord.com/stories/510990698-professor-says-judge-s-
opinion-on-implied-pooling-rights-marks-departure-from-state-oil-and-gas-law 
[https://perma.cc/6SEA-JX8G]; Robert J. Burnett & William J. Blakemore, Pooling 
Clause Not Necessary: West Virginia Court Finds Implied Right to Pool Exists 
Where Lease Silent (May 25, 2016), https://www.hh-law.com/driller-may-have-an-
implied-right-to-pool-lease-where-no-pooling-clause-exists/ 
[https://perma.cc/HM55-C4SC] (“No court has ever recognized an implied covenant 
to pool.”).   
 34. L&D Invs., Inc. v. Mike Ross, Inc., 818 S.E.2d 872, 875 (W. Va. 2018).  
 35. Id. 
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property tax assessment for 100% of the oil and gas interests remained 
solely in the name of Charles. Additional tax assessments were added 
to the Harrison County land books in 1988.36 The assessment under 
the “master assessment” in Charles’s name was paid each year through 
1999.37  
In 1999, several descendants claiming an interest in the oil and 
gas rights requested separation of their respective interests from the 
“master assessment.”38 The descendants paid their individual 
assessments each year, but the master assessment was not paid starting 
in 2000.39 The master assessment became delinquent, and a tax lien on 
the property in the name of Charles was sold at a delinquent tax sale 
to Mike Ross, Inc (“MRI”) in 2003.40 In 2013, L&D investments 
(“Petitioners”) purchased oil and gas interests from two of Mary’s 
decedents. L&D expected oil and gas royalties from the purchase but 
then learned that MRI owned the assets through a delinquent tax sale.41 
The circuit court granted summary judgment on the ground 
that the Petitioners’ claims were barred by a three-year statute of 
limitations.42 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
reversed, stating that “void tax sale deeds did not have a statute of 
limitations.”43 The Court further found that the circuit court erred by 
concluding that the petitioners’ ownership interests were “legitimately 
sold out from under them.”44 Because of the double assessments and 
the payment of the taxes by the Petitioners, the court determined that 
the mineral interests were never delinquent, and the sale was void.45 
 
V. STEAGER V. CONSOL ENERGY, INC. 
 
Consol Energy, Inc., d/b/a CNX Gas Company, LLC 
(“Consol”) and Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) own 
multiple gas wells in several West Virginia counties.46 The 
 
 36. Id. at 876. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 877. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 875. 
 43. Id. at 882. 
 44. Id. at 881. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Steager v. Consol Energy, Inc., 832 S.E.2d 135, 140 (W. Va. 2019). 
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Respondents (Consol and Antero) are the owners of traditional and 
horizontal gas wells.47 The gas wells are assessed for ad valorem taxes 
based on a formula created by the West Virginia State Tax 
Commissioner, Dale W. Steager.48 This case concerns the proper 
valuation of operating expense deductions for horizontal and 
traditional gas wells.49 
Consol and Antero first claimed that the Tax Department 
imposed a cap on operating expense deductions.50 The cap was 
described as both a percentage (30% for vertical wells and 20% for 
horizontal wells), and a monetary figure ($5,000 for vertical wells and 
$150,000 for horizontal wells).51 The Court was asked to determine 
whether the West Virginia Code allows for a cap placed on operating 
expense deductions and if the cap can be described as both a 
percentage and dollar figure.52 
Additionally, Consol and Antero argued that the operating 
expense deduction calculation, which did not include expenses 
associated with gathering, processing, and transporting the gas, 
resulted in an overvaluation of the gas wells.53 Finally, the Court 
needed to decide whether a monetary average was the correct 
calculation of operating expense deductions as opposed to an 
unlimited percentage.54 
The Court affirmed the business court’s finding that the use of 
a “not to exceed” amount or “cap” on operating expense deductions 
was not supported by the West Virginia Code § 110-1J 4.3.55 The cap 
singled out wells with higher gross receipts, and thus the cap applied 
a different percentage reduction for operating expenses. In doing so, 
the cap allowed the Tax Department to treat higher grossing and lower 
grossing wells differently and applied two different tax valuation 
methods depending on the well.56 This was in violation of the West 
Virginia Constitution Article X, Section 1 “equal and uniform” 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 141. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 140.  
 53. Id. at 142. 
 54. Id. at 140. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 142. 
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requirement, as well as the equal protection provisions of the West 
Virginia and United States Constitutions.57 
Next, the Tax Department had restricted the definition of 
operating expenses to only include costs relating to the maintenance 
and production of gas.58 However, the Tax Department calculated 
gross receipts at the point of sale, which they used to derive the tax on 
the producers.59 The process of bringing gas to the point of sale 
subjected producers to more operating expenses, including 
transportation expenses.60 Energy producers were not allowed to 
incorporate those transportation expenses in the operating expense 
calculation, meaning that the tax deduction for operating expenses did 
not include the total cost of bringing the gas to the market.61 
The business court concluded that operating expenses should 
include gathering, compressing, processing, and transporting 
expenses; and the Supreme Court agreed. However, the business court 
failed to provide a remedy on this issue, so the court determined that 
the Tax Department’s interpretation that the regulation includes post-
production expenses as part of the annual industry average operating 
expenses was correct.62 
Lastly, the Court concluded that a monetary average was the 
correct calculation for operating expenses, but that the monetary 
average should not be calculated as an unlimited percentage deduction 
for operating expenses.63 The Court found that the language of the 




 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 143. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 142. 
 62. Id. at 148. 
 63. Id. at 151. 
 64. Id. 
